Fed. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. Web18 U.S. Code 3665 - Firearms possessed by convicted felons. 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. Because a defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a felony under O.C.G.A. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434 (2004). Quinn v. State, 255 Ga. App. 697, 536 S.E.2d 565 (2000); Scott v. State, 276 Ga. 195, 576 S.E.2d 860 (2003); Laster v. State, 276 Ga. 645, 581 S.E.2d 522 (2003). 3d Art. 16-5-21(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. - Testimony by a ballistics expert proving the operability of the firearm is not required for conviction under O.C.G.A. denied, 546 U.S. 1019, 126 S. Ct. 656, 163 L. Ed. Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. The good news is that you have options. Smith v. State, 180 Ga. App. - Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not merge with act of shooting the firearm; therefore, a jury may find a convicted felon guilty of felony murder by treating the felon's possession of a firearm in committing the murder as the underlying felony. O.C.G.A. Evidence supported the defendants' convictions of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 86-4. 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. 370, 358 S.E.2d 912 (1987). 3d Art. Cade v. State, 351 Ga. App. Georgia may have more current or accurate information. Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. - Evidence that the defendant was found in possession of two black powder guns was sufficient to support the convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and by a convicted felon. 60, 653 S.E.2d 361 (2007); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. Testimony provided by two accomplices, together with inside information wherein defendant learned about the location of the robbery, the security camera on the premises, the people that worked there, how many people worked there, who was in the back area, and about the safe, when coupled with the fact that the gunman was not captured on the security camera, provided some evidence, though slight, that the robber had such inside information; under the circumstances, the accomplices' testimony was sufficiently corroborated, and the jury was authorized to find defendant guilty of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. - Clear impact of O.C.G.A. - Defendant's trial counsel could not be ineffective in failing to specifically demur to the charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the felony murder based on the same, as it was not necessary for the charge to state what felony formed the basis of the prior conviction. 775, 296 S.E.2d 110 (1982); Brooks v. State, 250 Ga. 739, 300 S.E.2d 810 (1983); Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. Butler v. State, 272 Ga. App. Absent a pardon, such an applicant commits a felony under O.C.G.A. Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, based upon defendant's and an accomplice's robbing a store at gunpoint, was affirmed because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as latent fingerprints, which belonged to defendant, that were found in the car used in the armed robbery sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the accomplice who identified defendant as the driver of the car before the accomplice recanted the accomplice's custodial statement at trial. - Propriety of using single prior felony conviction as basis for offense of possessing weapon by convicted felon and to enhance sentence, 37 A.L.R.4th 1168. There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant and the victim lived in the same rooming house where the defendant often intimidated the victim and demanded money from the victim, on the night of the crime the defendant sent the victim to buy crack cocaine and became angry when the victim returned empty-handed, the defendant argued with the victim and shot the victim in the eye, and at the hospital the victim repeatedly declined to say who shot the victim, except to say that a person with a first name other than the defendant's shot the victim accidentally. Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as the conviction was supported by more evidence than just defendant's mere spatial proximity to the gun because: (1) the jury could have inferred that defendant actually lived in the apartment rented by defendant's sister and that the items found in the apartment belonged to defendant; and (2) the gun was found in plain view on the television, which defendant claimed as defendant's own, next to defendant's keys to the apartment. Up to fifteen (15) years of probation. denied, 192 Ga. App. An order of restoration of civil rights granted by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles which expressly authorizes an individual to receive, possess, or transport a firearm satisfies the requirements of O.C.G.A. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007). Sufficiency of prior conviction to support prosecution under state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 39 A.L.R.4th 983. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. Johnson v. State, 308 Ga. 141, 839 S.E.2d 521 (2020). Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. 24, 601 S.E.2d 405 (2004). O.C.G.A. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 16-11-131(b). A: Previously, there was a misdemeanor called carrying a weapon without a license (in addition to the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon). Simpson v. State, 213 Ga. App. WebSec. Daogaru v. Brandon, F.3d (11th Cir. Evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's constructive possession of a gun because the defendant had access to the gun and had exercised control over the gun and there was evidence to corroborate the defendant's statement to police that the defendant had purchased a gun since the defendant knew where the gun was hidden and the defendant gave police permission to enter the room, indicating the intent to exert control over the room and contents. 2d 50 (2007). SPRINGFIELD, Ill. A federal jury returned a guilty verdict on February 22, 2023, against Aaron Jackson, 30, of Springfield, Ill. for knowingly possessing a firearm as a 61, 635 S.E.2d 353 (2006). Warren v. State, 289 Ga. App. I, Para. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. 778, 642 S.E.2d 837 (2007). 42, 520 S.E.2d 746 (1999); Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. When there was no evidence that a pistol was not a firearm, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the pistol was such beyond a reasonable doubt. 918, 368 S.E.2d 771 (1988); Spivey v. State, 193 Ga. App. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. The evidence authorized the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant used one firearm to shoot the victim and possessed another firearm in the defendant's bedroom. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, "of" was deleted following "Chapter " in subsection (e) (now (f)). 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). 2. - Victim's testimony at trial sufficiently identified the defendant as the assailant who fired shots at the victim and the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon since the victim knew the defendant from a previous encounter and although it was dark, the victim was able to see the defendant's face during the incident because the area was illuminated by a streetlight. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. 764, 315 S.E.2d 257 (1984). 801, 701 S.E.2d 202 (2010). 16-11-131, defendant was not entitled to the immunity offered by 16-3-24.2 State v. Burks, 285 Ga. 781, 684 S.E.2d 269 (2009). - When officers went to a defendant's residence to conduct a probation search based on a tip that the defendant was involved with drugs, as the defendant willingly led the officers to a concealed gun, and voluntarily furnished a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine, the defendant gave valid consent to the search, which eliminated the need for either probable cause or a search warrant under U.S. Charles Randy Payton Lewis, 29, was arrested in September 2022 and Porter v. State, 275 Ga. App. Waiver or Loss of Protection of Federal Attorney 'Work Product' Protection for Expert Witnesses Under Fed. Fact that weapon was acquired for self-defense or to prevent its use against defendant as defense in prosecution for violation of state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 39 A.L.R.4th 967. Midura v. State, 183 Ga. App. Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on the gun being found in close physical proximity to the defendant and that the defendant had in a pocket the exact number of the proper caliber bullets to completely reload the gun; although others had access to the car before the defendant took possession of the car, the evidence authorized the conclusion that the car had been visually inspected at a point close in time to when the defendant had sole access. 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told the witnesses that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. - Georgia Supreme Court held that the phrase any firearm, as used in O.C.G.A. 313, 744 S.E.2d 833 (2013). I, Para. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. Because sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence showed that the defendant, a prior felon wielding a weapon, engaged in a fight with the two victims, fatally wounding one and shooting the other in the arm, and thereafter fled from police, the defendant's convictions for involuntary manslaughter, reckless conduct, fleeing and eluding, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were upheld on appeal. As used in this Code section, the term "forcible felony" means any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any person and further includes, without limitation, murder; murder in the second degree; burglary in any degree; robbery; armed robbery; home invasion in any degree; kidnapping; hijacking of an aircraft or hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree; aggravated stalking; rape; aggravated child molestation; aggravated sexual battery; arson in the first degree; the manufacturing, transporting, distribution, or possession of explosives with intent to kill, injure, or intimidate individuals or destroy a public building; terroristic threats; or acts of treason or insurrection. - Juvenile court erred by modifying the juvenile's disposition after determining that the disposition was void on the ground that the juvenile's conduct did not qualify as a Class-B felony because carrying a weapon in a school zone qualified as a Class-B designated felony under O.C.G.A. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google, There is a newer version The same restriction does not apply for long guns like rifles and shotguns. 734, 783 S.E.2d 133 (2016). 16-11-131, criminalizing a felon's firearm possession, gave insufficient notice to defendant that the Pennsylvania misdemeanor could be a predicate felony for a charge under the statute. 604, 327 S.E.2d 566 (1985). Att'y Gen. No. - With regard to a defendant's convictions on two counts of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, failure to obey a traffic control device, fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer, reckless driving, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions as the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain bullets found in the defendant's possession at the time of the defendant's arrest based on the state allegedly not providing a proper chain of custody; the bullets, unlike fungible articles, were distinct and recognizable physical objects that were identifiable by observation, eliminating the necessity of a chain-of-custody showing. - See Murray v. State, 180 Ga. App. 1980 Op. 434, 346 S.E.2d 881 (1986); Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 5. 618, 829 S.E.2d 820 (2019). Web(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm: (1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the persons release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or (a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) Felony means 105, 817 S.E.2d 557 (2018); Barber v. State, 350 Ga. App. 16-11-131. 2d 213 (1984). 273, 297 S.E.2d 47 (1982). Jury was authorized to find that guns found in defendant's automobile were actual working firearms since there was no evidence introduced to refute a police officer's testimony that the guns were pistols. Malone v. State, 337 Ga. App. Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006). 711, 350 S.E.2d 53 (1986). WEAPONS AND FIREARMS. 3d Art. Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006). - Defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was not precluded by collateral estoppel where defendant was acquitted of two other charges (aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime against a person) arising out of the same incident; the jury could have concluded that defendant had the gun but did not assault or attempt to rob the victim with it. 16-11-131, since the violation of that statute was an other crime not shown to be connected with the one on trial, served no useful or relevant purpose, placed the defendant's character in evidence, and was prejudicial to the defendant. Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006). - Because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to the defendant's felon status or to obtain a jury charge limiting the jury's consideration of the defendant's criminal history, such failures prejudiced the defendant's defense sufficiently to require a new trial on a charge of aggravated assault; however, given the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the altercation, no prejudice resulted to warrant reversal and a new trial on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. Rev. Section 46.04 of the Texas Penal Code specifically states that a person who has been The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, substituted "as a matter of law pursuant to Code Section 42-8-60" for "pursuant to Code Section 42-8-62" near the middle of subsection (f). 1986 Op. - Trial court erred in failing to merge, for purposes of sentencing, the defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with use of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of another felony, because the same act was used to establish each of the offenses and each crime did not require proof of a fact not required by the other. Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848, 734 S.E.2d 1 (2012). 16-11-131(b), because during an argument with the victims, the defendant shot the victims and threatened to kill the victims. (1) Felony means any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more and includes conviction by a court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military 16-11-131, the trial court properly dismissed the charge. State may convict and punish for burglary and for unlawful possession of firearm by a previously convicted felon, when the firearm was taken in the burglary. 127, 386 S.E.2d 868 (1989), cert. denied, No. .050 Possession of 16-5-3(a), a killing resulting from an unlawful act other than a felony. Possession of 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (2009). 7, 806 S.E.2d 302 (2017). Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 2d 213 (1984). WebGeorgia Code 16-11-131. Davis v. State, 325 Ga. App. 15-11-2 and "firearm" included "handguns" under O.C.G.A. Defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was proper because the act of any one of the conspirators involved was the act of all, and because the defendant's co-conspirator possessed a weapon, it followed that the defendant was in constructive possession of the weapon. Cited in Robinson v. State, 159 Ga. App. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. 16-11-131, insufficiency in the proof of this element demands entry of a judgment of acquittal as to that offense; thus, since the Court of Appeals determined that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant was a convicted felon, it was error for that court to remand the case for a hearing on the sole issue of whether the defendant had in fact pled guilty to any prior charges. Fed. 16-11-131. 2016 Statute. 45 (2018). - Prior felony conviction under O.C.G.A. Att'y Gen. No. 16-11-131(b), indicated that the quantity of firearms was inconsequential and that the gravamen of the offense was the general receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms by convicted felons, rather than the specific quantity of firearms received, possessed, or transported and, therefore, the statute unambiguously permitted only one conviction for simultaneous possession of any number of firearms.